First Administration: Civic Progress & Racial Setbacks
Many issues loomed when voters went to the polls in 1913 to elect a new mayor of St. Louis. Although out-going Republican Mayor Frederick H. Kreismann’s administration ended on a record of success, there was still more to be accomplished. The problems associated with city government, specifically the city charter, civic and economic growth, and race relations continued to plague the city. The vote centered on the candidate that could best achieve for the city centralized self-governance, expanded commercial and industrial investment, and improved social conditions.
Despite being the losing candidate for sheriff only six months before,[i] St. Louis voters elected Henry W. Kiel the thirty-sixth mayor of the city on April 1, 1913, to build upon Kreismann’s record. With a plurality of only 2,380 votes, Kiel narrowly defeated Democratic candidate Dr. John Simon.[ii] Ironically, Henry and his family had boarded a train bound for Texas, where his construction company had been contracted for work, when it appeared likely that Simon would win the election. Kiel’s victory signaled a new era of civic improvement and progress in St. Louis, pledging in his inaugural address the completion of several municipal projects, the passage of key civic bonds, and an increase in industrial growth.[iii] Though the new administration faced a split legislature – a Democratic House of Delegates and Republican Council – a Republican majority in the Council gave the new administration a clear advantage.[iv]
Kiel’s first major victory was the passage of a new city charter in 1914, something the city had struggled with for decades. Endorsed by the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive city committees, as well as virtually all civic, social, and business organizations, the charter narrowly passed by a majority of 2,681 votes with 61 percent of registered voters casting ballots.[v] Growing out of a failed 1911 initiative, the charter movement resulted from deep class and ethnic divisions in the city of St. Louis. Reformers had to appease both those who identified with their ward and wanted more services for it, and the more affluent citizens who wished for better citywide efficiency.
With city government given broader powers and control over public utilities, charter opponents feared an increase in property taxes affecting the lower classes more than the affluent. As a result, a new unicameral Board of Aldermen replaced the bicameral legislature, composed of one representative elected by citywide vote from each of the twenty-eight wards. It was hoped this would satisfy all concerned, and allow greater internal legislative control over the city. The new charter also provided for a Board of Estimate and Apportionment, consisting of the Mayor, the Comptroller, and the president of the Board of Aldermen – all elected officials. The Board minimized the mayor’s power by taking away sole budgetary and contractual authority.[vi]
Despite the changes, municipal elections retained a partisan character under the new charter. Since there was no provision for a merit-based civil service, the patronage system still ruled. Citywide elections made it possible for one party to control all city politics – increasing the overall influence of the mayor - and did very little to alleviate the fragmentation caused by the ward system. Ward committeemen could supply workers for civil positions, with each new election causing a complete turnover of city officials. In such respects, the 1914 Charter was no different than the failed proposals of 1876 or 1911.[vii]
Flawed as it was, Kiel was able to finish what his predecessors had not as a result of the charter’s passage: the Municipal Free Bridge. During Democrat Rolla Wells’ administration, voters had passed a $3.5 million bond issue in 1905 to complete the span.[viii] The funds, however, proved to be insufficient and the project became a nightmare to both the Wells and Kreismann administrations. In his inaugural speech, Kiel had called the issue the biggest problem facing the city, citing several plans rejected by the people. He believed it to be his administration’s duty to submit a plan that the people of the city could accept, including reduced taxes and lower interest rates.[ix] On November 6, 1914, a new bond issue totaling $2.75 million was proposed,[x] passing by a seven-to-one majority.[xi]
As provided by the new city charter, union laborers, a key supporter of the bond issue, began work immediately on the Municipal Bridge. While the railroad portion would not open for another eight months, Kiel opened the bridge for public use on January 20, 1917, nearly 11 years from the time of its proposal. Now, industries like coal producers could cross the river into the city from East St. Louis without paying a tribute (“the arbitrary”) to the railroad companies. As a result, the bridge would stimulate commercial growth in the city, as many industries had moved to the Illinois side to avoid the arbitrary.[xii] It was a major victory for Kiel and the supporters of the city charter.
During this period as well, the Kiel administration accomplished what the city had sought for decades: a zoo. As early as 1876, St. Louis began collecting animals to put on display in Forest Park. By 1896, however, the collection had stagnated. It was not until 1911 that the Zoological Society of St. Louis, organized by James Abbott and George Dieckman, had begun the process of creating a municipally supported institution. In 1916, St. Louisans voted to construct the St. Louis Zoo on 77-acres in Forest Park, set aside in 1913 for that purpose. Through the passage of a property tax to maintain it, St. Louis became the first city in the world to have a community supported zoo.[xiii]
Dwight F. Davis, the city parks commissioner, had opposed the effort. His position was not based on opposition to the zoo itself. He just did not want it in Forest Park. Located in proximity to newly constructed pools, tennis courts and the golf course, Davis believed a zoo would infringe on the recreational functionality of the park. He urged the mayor to veto any legislation authorizing a Forest Park-based zoo, despite Kiel’s endorsement of the plan during the 1913 mayoral campaign due to the park’s central location. With the help of Dieckman and others, Kiel was able to gain the support of the public and the Board of Aldermen for the zoo’s location.[xiv]
Although civic improvements and economic successes stimulated civic pride, progress was diluted by the ugliness of prejudice. This became evident on February 29, 1916, when St. Louis joined a handful of cities to pass a residential segregation ordinance.[xv] White residents feared black migration into their neighborhoods, and believed that something had to be done. In 1910, blacks accounted for only 6.2% of the total population.[xvi] By 1914, there were five discernible black districts: Morgan & 8th Street to Ewing; Market & Pine between 20th Street & Cardinal/Compton Avenue; Finney Avenue; Elleardsville, which extended from Vandeventer to Taylor and Easton to Fairgrounds Park; and finally, the Mill Creek Valley, which extended from Union Station west to Kingshighway. Except for the Elleardsville and Finney Avenue districts, housing conditions were pitiful. A majority of the residents lived in dilapidated structures under unsanitary conditions, and had to contend with high rents, overcrowded dwellings and smoke from the local railroads and factories.[xvii]
With a majority of black residents already living in squalor and with little means to remedy their situation, the ordinance would effectively continue that life. As one black minister stated, it was no more than an attempt to “assassinate the Negro race.”[xviii] As early as 1908, various housing associations had demonstrated de facto segregation by maintaining high property values against non-white buyers. In 1911, the United Welfare Association (U.W.A), a delegation of various city improvement associations, first proposed a segregation bill to the St. Louis Municipal Assembly. Even though the Association stated it would benefit both white and black residents, the bill had been introduced to counteract the affect black residents were having on property values of white residences.[xix] Introduced in 1913 to the Assembly, the bill lingered for three years due mostly to Republican opposition.
The original bill, drafted by Judge Seneca Taylor, was seen as a way to conserve property values, as well as the general public welfare, peace and good order among the people of St. Louis. In their opinion, the U.W.A. felt that a special election on the issue of segregation was in the best interest of the city and all classes of society. They maintained that no malice or prejudice was intended in the attempt to rescue white homes from the negative effects of black homebuyers. Even with that said, the Association stated that there had been an increasing protest against the encroachment of blacks into white neighborhoods for years:
“...it was peculiarly aggravating in the evident desire of certain Negroes to leave the community of their own color and seek entrance into the midst of white-home neighborhoods…the Negroes were misguided and mistaken in their desire to invade such neighborhoods.”[xx]
Ironically, the new city charter, championed by Kiel, became the tool for unblocking the impasse through the newly established initiative process.[xxi] Under the procedure, U.W.A. obtained the necessary signatures by December 1915 to call a special election concerning the segregation bill.[xxii] In response, the Antinegro Segregation Committee was established, headquartered in the Railway Exchange Building. Composed of both black and white citizens, including Frank P. Crunden, Roger Baldwin, and Charles Pittman, the Committee worked to inform and motivate voters to vote down the ordinance. Kiel, an advocate of the Committee, campaigned on their behalf at several occasions.[xxiii]
Kiel and other Republican leaders maintained a vigilant stance against the bill, as they had throughout the entire mayoral campaign. To the relief of many in the black community, Kiel promised to veto anything that came across his desk and keep it from being a future election issue.[xxiv] Personally, he opposed any law that restricted the rights of citizens and did not give equality to all. On the matter of law, he believed that the courts would no doubt declare any such ordinance adopted by St. Louis unconstitutional for violating the rights of black citizens. Moreover, he felt that legislated segregation would hinder the growth of the black community, and the city overall.[xxv] He believed, along with many others, that “…the fair name of St. Louis will be blotted because of the selfishness of a few real estate men.”[xxvi]
In an attempt to block any vote, scheduled for February 29, 1916, several lawsuits were brought before the courts. In January, City Counselor Charles Daues, an opponent to segregation and Kiel’s first cousin from his mother’s side, took the Board of Election Commissioners to court. The issue centered on the registration of an estimated 50,000 voters not yet registered. Daues argued that should they be deprived from registering, it would disenfranchise a majority of black voters. The Board, however, felt he and the mayor were only attempting to ingratiate themselves to the black community, contending their actions thwarted the will of the people, specifically the 17,000 legal voters in favor of the election, and blocked the mandates of the new city charter. Daues, however, continued the argument on the premise that the Board had no authority to hold a special election, as St. Louis Circuit Court Judge Fisher had issued a restraining order against it.[xxvii]
In the meantime, lawyer Homer G. Phillips had filed a separate injunction suit on behalf of all black city residents. In his argument, Phillips attacked the validity of the initiative clause of the city charter. The Board of Alderman, ignoring the initiative petitions, refused to call the election; as a result, the Board of Elections was mandated to call it. Citing that the legislature had not “passed” on a vote to enact a segregation law, Phillips argued that the people of the city could not initiate a campaign to pass the bill by popular election.[xxviii] St. Louis Circuit Court Judge George Shields denied the injunction. Joined by attorney George L. Vaughn and former Congressman Henry S. Caulfield, Phillips appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.[xxix] Again, the lawyers’ efforts were ineffective. Judge Henry W. Bond sustained the lower courts decision, stating that the court could not decide as to the validity of an act that was being legislated by the initiative process. Only after such an act had been enacted, could the court decide on the matter; as for the initiative process itself, Bond maintained its legality.[xxx]
Despite such efforts against it, city voters passed the ordinance by a three-to-one majority. Although white residents cast approximately one-third of the opposing votes, the outcome of the special election reflected the racial tensions brewing under the surface of the city,[xxxi] as whites accounted for the majority vote.[xxxii] Although Baltimore had enacted the “West Segregation Ordinance” in 1911,[xxxiii] St. Louis became the first city in the history of the United States to pass such an act by popular vote. Barring black residents from white neighborhoods, schools, churches and other public places of assembly, and vice versa, the ordinance would go into effect ten days from the date of the election.[xxxiv] Following the same language as the Baltimore law, the ordinance read:
“For preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling between the white and colored races in the city of St. Louis, and promoting the general welfare of the city by providing, so far as practicable, for the use of separate blocks by white and colored people for residences, churches and schools.” [xxxv]
Black civic leaders were outraged. They declared that the Republican ward bosses, who had promised to defeat the bill, had betrayed them. Despite Kiel’s efforts against the ordinance, his stronghold – the 15th ward – voted in favor of it. This was a major blow to the Republican rhetoric directed at black voters of an expanded, integrated city. The fact that the two Democratic strongholds – the 5th and 17th wards – voted against the ordinance did not help matters.[xxxvi]
A glimmer of hope still existed, however. In October 1912, four years before the St. Louis election, the Baltimore ordinance had gone before the courts. Judge Elliott of the Criminal Court of Baltimore, stated that the law was nothing more than a calculated attempt to cause ill-feeling than to prevent it – “as to preserving the peace, the Police Department is organized to do that.”[xxxvii] While that case journeyed through the court system, the St. Louis voters passed the U.W.A.-sponsored bill. The Committee on Housing of Negroes echoed the same objections to the St. Louis ordinance that Elliot had proclaimed. The Committee maintained that such an ordinance would discriminate against colored people, prevent them from improving their conditions, and crystallize socio-political inequality through legislation. They also stated that contrary to the U.W.A. opinion, the ordinance would be a hindrance to whites attempting to sell their property in accordance with the law – a worse affect on property values than black neighbors.[xxxviii]
With the U.S. Supreme Court deciding the constitutionality of a similar Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance, U.S. District Court Judge David Dyer issued a temporary injunction against the St. Louis law. Dyer expressed his opinion of segregation in his order:
“The Negro is entitled to the same rights as is a white man. And, gentlemen, it would be a shame for me not to administer justice to them. The Negro doesn’t want social equality. He wants the same rights before the law as the white man and he should have them.”[xxxix]
Expressing the hope of many, Daues stated that the outcome of the Louisville case held the fate of the St. Louis ordinance, as they were identical in nature.[xl] When the Supreme Court declared the Louisville law unconstitutional in November of 1917, Dyer’s injunction became permanent, effectively stopping the St. Louis ordinance from ever being implemented.[xli] Such an overt act, however, had already done its damage, and associations continued to utilize “restrictive covenants” to maintain de facto neighborhood segregation. Many realty companies, under the aegis of the Real Estate Exchange, maintained policies that did exactly what the ordinance had been intended to do – restrict the racial composition of neighborhoods.[xlii]
Just six years later, the Real Estate Exchange would approve a referendum of member companies in 1923 that would keep them from selling to blacks outside designated districts.[xliii] Brokers were free to sell or rent to blacks within the “unrestricted colored districts,” but all other areas were restricted. Although not specifically a covenant, all realtors were bound by the policy when dealing with black clients. The Exchange maintained a trustee interest in 85% of covenant agreements, often times drawing up the contract themselves and canvassing for the signatures. There was the assumption that the covenants had legal and constitutional support, thus providing a rationalization for their use. As a result, the Exchange continually acted through neighborhood improvement groups to organize, in effect, de jure segregation.[xliv] Thus, despite the rulings of the courts, racial segregation was very much prevalent in St. Louis throughout Kiel’s administration and years to come thereafter.
Second Administration: Civic Virtue & Loyalty Tested
Notwithstanding the setback to race relations, Kiel’s first term in office had accomplished a great deal that his predecessors had been unable to achieve. In light of the conflict in Europe and the expected involvement of the United States in it, none of that success remotely mattered when the mayoral race began anew in 1917. The call of war put civic reform on hold, and bound St. Louisans together in a “common hatred of the Hun.”[xlv] From 1890 to 1910, estimates put the German-born population of the United States between two and three million, the heaviest immigrations occurring in the 1850s and 1880s. A majority of these immigrants came to settle in the “German triangle” area – Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and St. Louis;[xlvi] in St. Louis alone, the German-born population in 1910 stood close to 18 percent of the total, with numerous German language publications. When the conflict in Europe erupted in 1914, these German-Americans found themselves torn between their ancestral heritage and their adopted country. They found themselves the victims of backlash: public schools ended German-language classes, German culture was expunged from libraries and the arts, and citizens were subject to lynching.[xlvii]
From the mayor on down, no one was immune. Despite the large German-American population, Kiel and others of German descent became targets of anti-German sentiment and propaganda in the name of patriotism. “When Disloyalty Becomes A Virtue, Kiel Is The Man To Represent That Idea, Says Schmoll,” read the front page of the March 1917 American Justice. The headline referred to a statement by John Schmoll, chairman of the Republican City Committee, which had stressed the importance of the German vote to reaffirm the ideals of America by backing a loyal German-American. Meant to emphasize Kiel’s chances of winning the German-American vote in the event of war with Germany, Schmoll’s words were twisted to mean a vote for a German-American was a traitor’s vote for “Germanism in government.” [xlviii] St. Louis voters were not swayed. Owing to the passage of the city charter, various civic improvements, and his campaign against segregation, Mayor Kiel overwhelmingly defeated Democratic candidate William C. Connett with a plurality of 23,401 votes.[xlix]
In response to the mud-slinging over his heritage, Kiel simply stated that “…it is the duty of every good American citizen to loyally back up the president of the United States…the government needs the support of every citizen and has mine in the fullest.”[l] There was more than just rhetoric behind his words. He proclaimed April 5, 1917, as Loyalty Day, calling for all citizens of St. Louis “to make manifest in their homes, places of business, and wherever practicable by the display of the national colors or the wearing of the flag, or in such other way as may be convenient, [to show] their loyalty to our beloved country.”[li] The next day, he presided over a huge loyalty gala of St. Louis citizens from all nationalities. In the end, the Democratic attack on the mayor’s nationality failed, infusing instead a sense of common cause among Anglo- and German-Americans alike.[lii]
With his loyalty firmly established, Kiel made good on his campaign promises. In 1914, the Civic League had organized a “Pageant and Masque” to generate enthusiasm for a new charter. An indirect result of these festivities, and the passage of the new charter, would be the founding of the Municipal Opera. The event, held on Forest Park’s Art Hill from May 28 to June 1, 1914, celebrated the 150th anniversary of St. Louis by highlighting the city’s history.[liii] It stressed the participation of various ethnic groups in forging the city, with a common goal of “...urban reform based on community pride and civic virtue.”[liv] As a summertime diversion, the spectacle nearly overshadowed its purpose of motivating the electorate through idealized images of a deep, rich history.[lv]
The Pageant Drama Association, which had overseen the “Pageant and Masque,” held several performances between 1916 and 1917, but it was not until the summer of 1919 that the Municipal Opera Theater officially began operation. At that time, Kiel appointed a committee to consider the possibilities and benefits of building upon the success of the Pageant. In response, the committee organized the Municipal Theatre Association to fund the public project. Although opening night on June 15, 1919, was ruined by a flooding River des Peres, the theater continued successfully deficit-free in ensuing seasons throughout the Kiel administration, thanks largely to the persistence of the mayor himself, the Association, and other civic sponsors.[lvi]
On July 2, 1917, the city of St. Louis was presented with an opportunity to redeem itself in terms of race relations. Workers at the large aluminum ore company in East St. Louis had been on strike for many weeks. To destroy the union, the plant imported black strikebreakers. For a multitude of reasons, including low wages, corruption in the city government, and numerous accounts of crime attributed to blacks, the white residents of East St. Louis began a murderous campaign against black residents. They lynched men and women, burned down homes, and outright murdered many innocent black victims.[lvii] In response, St. Louis police guarded the bridges from East St. Louis to protect the fleeing black citizens from pursuing mobs. The city provided housing and food with the help of the Red Cross and other relief agencies, and provided sanctuary in several municipal buildings opened specifically for such purpose.[lviii] For a city that only a year before had passed a segregation ordinance, it was a tremendous welcome for the black citizens of East St. Louis.
Third Administration: Civic Mandate & Machine Politics
Seeking a third term in 1921, Kiel had no predecessor scapegoats or national pride issues to fall back on. There were, however, accusations of machine politics, scandal, and corruption to fend off. The Democratic candidate, James W. Byrnes, cited fiscal mismanagement on the part of the Administration. He charged specifically that money from the Comptroller’s office had gone into the pockets of the men of the “Kiel Machine,” and misappropriation of the Sinking Fund for illegal use.[lix] Byrnes charge was an attack on partisan politics in an age of such. The newspapers of St. Louis even proclaimed a third term for Kiel as an unfair continuation of the Republican machine; what his administration had done for the city the past eight years had no bearing. The Globe-Democrat, a Republican supporter, stated that “…a political machine in control of a city government is an evil, however benevolent it may be, and city government will never become an efficient business institution, conducted solely for the public service, until machine politics is eliminated from it.”[lx] The voters disagreed, and gave Mayor Kiel a third term with a plurality of 9,572 votes.[lxi]
Mayor Kiel’s record had spoken for itself. To advance industrial growth, Kiel had consistently fought for measures that encouraged it. Industrial plants were given preferential rates for water and allowed liberal policies concerning the recess of streets and alleys to assure investment in infrastructure. There were clear indicators for the effectiveness of such measures: in 1912, the total inbound and outbound tonnage amounted to 51 million tons; by 1916, the total tonnage exceeded 60 million – a 15 percent increase. Similarly, bank clearings grew from just over $4 billion in 1912 to $5.25 billion by 1916 – a 30 percent increase – while the value of manufactured products increased 35 percent.[lxii] Whether this economic growth was directly attributable to Kiel’s “machine,” the city prospered nonetheless.
The city government itself spoke even louder for the administration’s record. While efficiency was demonstrated by citywide economic achievements, the city’s own fiscal management reflected it as well.[lxiii] In 1903, the city had adopted an ordinance requiring United Railways Company (U.R.C.) to pay a tax of one mill for each revenue passenger it carried. After a lengthy legal fight, the city finally won the case on June 16, 1916. Culminating from thirty years of litigation, the collection of the long-disputed mill tax from U.R.C. paid to the city treasury the sum of approximately $1.8 million in back taxes.[lxiv] Likewise, Comptroller Louis Nolte was able to report on April 14, 1924, that a deficit of one million dollars had been completely wiped out; in its place stood a surplus of $145,441. As a result, St. Louis was one of the few major cities with per capita receipts larger than its expenditures - $44.88 to $40.02, respectively.[lxv]
Kiel’s last, and greatest, victory came on February 9, 1923, when voters approved an $87 million bond issue to fund a number of civic improvements. At the time, it was the largest bond ever approved in the United States by a city.[lxvi] The bond issue provided for widening of the city streets and replacement of gas streetlights with electric ones, as well as various improvements to existing buildings and construction of new ones, including a city hospital for black residents. Other provisions included funding for a new waterworks extension on the Missouri River, and the channeling of the polluted River des Peres into an underground sewer. Projects that both Kiel and the City of St. Louis had wanted to pursue for some time – the construction of a Soldier’s Memorial, a municipal auditorium, and the improvement of blighted areas – were provided for. Notably, the bond issue had little impact on property taxes in subsequent years of the decade, even if net debt for the same period increased from $19 million to $82 million.[lxvii]
(Source: Harland Bartholomew: His Contributions To American Urban Planning)
By 1925, the population of the metropolitan area was nearing the one and a half million mark, with more than half residing within the city limits of St. Louis. Unfortunately, a negative trend had been forming for decades. While the city saw a 19% overall increase in population between 1910 and 1930, fewer people were moving into the city over that same period: the population increased close to 13% from 1910-1920, but only half that amount from 1920-1930.[lxviii] Nonetheless, St. Louis was on the upswing as Kiel left office. Statistics in the 1925 edition of the Polk-Gould St. Louis Directory left little doubt of it. The city was well-balanced in terms of business: 53% industrial activity combined with 47% merchandising, with annual commercial business exceeding the one billion mark. Annual interest per capita of the city’s indebtedness was among the lowest in the country: $1.17 compared to $2.19 for Kansas City, the next largest metro area in the state, and substantially well below Cleveland’s $5.03. The city’s public schools, constituted of seven high schools and 92 elementary schools, had an enrollment of 150,000; this was complemented by 19 special schools and 17 colored schools, as well as two universities (Washington University and Saint Louis University) and a teachers college (Harris-Stowe).[lxix]
One campaign promise from Kiel’s second term remained unfilled: the construction of a city garbage plant. In 1917, The Republican platform had called for a municipally owned garbage plant. The Board of Alderman first voted it down, but the Mayor persuaded them to approve it at a special meeting.[lxx] The Board appropriated $15,000 for an experimental garbage plant, but it failed to produce the desired results. When the existing contract with the Indiana Reduction Company terminated in February 1919, the opportunity to fulfill the campaign promise again presented itself. Indiana Reduction initially offered to sell their plant to the city for $336,000, later tendering a reduced amount of $200,000. The Board of Aldermen turned down both offers. In the meantime, the cost of handling the city’s garbage had risen from $3.12 a ton to $6.35 a ton between 1917 and 1921 – costing the city an average of $150,000 a year to process the city’s trash.[lxxi]
Aside from the Board of Alderman’s obstinacy, the intervening years of the First World War interrupted any plans to build a garbage plant due to the war effort. When the war ended, a market no longer existed for the by-products produced by such a plant. Even more, with rising construction costs after the war, the city’s least expensive option was to continue to have a private company haul away the city’s garbage.[lxxii] Kiel had remained optimistic throughout that a city plant would materialize, but none ever did during his administration.
Conclusion
Walter P. Tracy, in Men Who Made Saint Louis the City of Opportunity, described Mayor Henry W. Kiel’s administration as unblemished. This is hardly a factual statement. From the evidence, it can be seen that directly or indirectly there were stains on the record from all three terms. This is not to say that it was worse than any other administration, or any better. To be more precise, it was traditional. Working within the political system of the time, his administration was able to accomplish what previous ones could not, most notably improvements in administration and civic progress. Unfortunately, he was unable to make St. Louis a city for all despite the efforts of his administration.
In May 1941, Kiel suffered a paralytic stroke. Eighteen months later, seriously ill and confined to bed, he slipped into a coma on the evening of November 26, 1942, at his home on Missouri Avenue. He died that same night. Public services were held at the Scottish Rite Cathedral on Lindell; a private family service was conducted at St. Mark’s English Lutheran Church. He was later buried in the mausoleum of Oak Grove Cemetery.[lxxiii] By the time of his death, the three term Republican mayor could rest in peace knowing he had maintained the integrity of the city of his birth and kept it looking to the future.
©2003 Steve Sagarra
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[i] St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 4 November 1912, sec. A.
[ii] “Republican Comes Out Victorious In Race With Dr. Simon,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 2 April 1913, sec. A.
[iii] “Progress Is Pledge At Kiel Inaugural,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 13 April 1913, sec. A.
[iv] “Republican Comes Out Victorious In Race With Dr. Simon.”
[v] “Charter Carries By 2681,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 1 July 1914, sec. A.
[vi] Lana Stein, St. Louis Politics: The Triumph of Tradition (Saint Louis: 2002), 11.
[vii] Stein, 11-13.
[viii] “Free Bridge Opening Program,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 20 January 1917, sec. A.
[ix] “Progress Is Pledge At Kiel Inaugural,” sec. A.
[x] “Free Bridge Opening Program.”
[xi] Kiel Endorsers, “Reasons Why You Should Be A Kiel Endorser,” in Henry W. Kiel Political Envelope 1917-1919 [Missouri Historical Society], (St. Louis: 1921), 4.
[xii] “Free Bridge Opening Program.”
[xiii] City of St. Louis, “The St. Louis Zoo,” n.d., <http://stlouis.missouri.org/citygov/parks/forestpark/history/zoo.html> (13 February 2003).
[xiv] James Neal Primm, Lion of the Valley (Saint Louis: 1998), 407- 408.
[xv] “Prejudice Wins Election,” St. Louis Argus, 3 March 1916.
[xvi] 1950 Census (United States: U.S. Census Bureau, 1950), cited in Irwin Sobel et al, The Negro In the St. Louis Economy, 1954 (St. Louis: Urban League of St. Louis, Inc., c. 1954), 14.
[xvii] William A. Crossland, Industrial Conditions Among Negroes in St. Louis (St. Louis: 1914), 10 – 11.
[xviii] Reverend George E. Stevens, Negro Segregation: A Measure To Assassinate A Race in St. Louis, MO.; A Statement of Principles, A Review of Race Relations and A Protest (St. Louis: C. K. Robinson Printing Co., 1915), 1.
[xix] Committee on Housing of Negroes, The Legal Segregation of Negroes In Saint Louis (St. Louis: Allied Print Trades Council, 1913), 3.
[xx] “United Welfare Society Declares Segregation Guards Whites, Negroes,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 19 February 1916.
[xxi] Stein, 14-15.
[xxii] Primm, 411.
[xxiii] “Segregation Opponents Open Offices Downtown,” St. Louis Republic, 13 February 1916.
[xxiv] Elizabeth Noel Schmidt, Civic Pride and Prejudice: St. Louis Progressive Reform, 1900-1916 (St. Louis: 1986), 126.
[xxv] “Mayor Kiel Against Race Segregation,” The St. Louis Argus, 14 May 1915.
[xxvi] “Segregation Poll Disgrace to City, Mayor Declares,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 24 February 1916.
[xxvii] “Daues and Election Board in War Over Negro Segregation,” St. Louis Republic, 11 January 1916.
[xxviii] “Daues and Election Board in War Over Negro Segregation.”
[xxix] “Injunction To Prevent Segregation Election Is Asked of Supreme Court,” St. Louis Republic, 14 February 1916.
[xxx] “Supreme Court Refused to Stop Segregation Vote,” St. Louis Republic, 22 February 1916.
[xxxi] Stein, 14-15.
[xxxii] “Prejudice Wins Election”
[xxxiii] Committee, Legal Segregation, 3 – 4.
[xxxiv] “Prejudice Wins Election”
[xxxv] Municipal Assembly of the City of St. Louis, An Ordinance, 29 February 1916, 1.
[xxxvi] “Negro Leaders Vow Revenge on G.O.P. For Their Betrayal,” St. Louis Republic, 1 March 1916.
[xxxvii] Committee, Legal Segregation, 5.
[xxxviii] Committee, Legal Segregation, 6.
[xxxix] “Negroes Jubilant As Segregation In City is Restrained,” St. Louis Republic, 18 April 1916.
[xl] “Louisville Segregation Act Up in U.S. High Court,” St. Louis Republic, 6 May 1916.
[xli] “Decision Kills St. Louis Negro Segregation,” St. Louis Republic, 6 November 1917.
[xlii] “Segregation of Negro Districts Approved By Realtors’ Referendum,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 31 August 1923.
[xliii] “Segregation of Negro Districts Approved By Realtors’ Referendum.”
[xliv] Department of Race Relations, People vs. Property, 61; 68-69; 8.
[xlv] Schmidt, 149.
[xlvi] Library of Congress, “The Germans in America,” 9 August 2004, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/european/imde/germchro.html> (23 May 2005).
[xlvii] U.S. Census Bureau, 1910 Census of the United States, quoted in Harry Levins, “World War I,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch 13 January 2004, sec.
[xlviii] “When Disloyalty Becomes A Virtue, Kiel Is The Man To Represent That Idea, Says Schmoll,” American Justice March 1917, in John H. Gundlach Collection [Missouri Historical Society].
[xlix] “Re-Elected Mayor By 23,401,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 4 April 1917.
[l] “Kiel Pledges Loyalty to U.S. ‘in Fullest Measure’ – Connett Says It’s Duty of All to Stand Behind Wilson,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 3 April 1917, sec. A.
[li] “Mayor Kiel Sets ‘Loyalty Day’; Aldermen Affirm Americanism,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 5 April 1917, sec. A.
[lii] “Big Coliseum Crowd Affirms Its Loyalty,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 6 April 1917, sec. A.
[liii] Primm, 403 - 404.
[liv] Schmidt, 102.
[lv] Eric Sandweiss, St. Louis: The Evolution of An American Urban Landscape (Philadelphia: 2001), 208.
[lvi] City of St. Louis, “The Muny Opera,” n.d., <http://stlouis.missouri.org/citygov/parks/forestpark/history/opera.html> (13 February 2003).
[lvii] “Many Hurt In East St. Louis Riot,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 29 May 1917, sec. A.
[lviii] “Mob Said To Have Killed 100 Negroes,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 3 July 1917, sec. A.
[lix] “Text of Byrnes Speech at Odeon,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 3 April 1921, sec. A.
[lx] “Mayor Kiel’s Third Term,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 7 April 1921, sec. A.
[lxi] “Elected Mayor By Plurality of 9,572,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 6 April 1921, sec. A.
[lxii] Kiel Endorsers, 11.
[lxiii] Kiel Endorsers, 15.
[lxiv] Kiel Endorsers, 5-6.
[lxv] “Surplus of $145, 441 In City’s Revenues,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat 14 April 1924.
[lxvi] Metropolitan Sewer District, “1923 St. Louis Bond Issue Expands and Rehabs Sewer System,” January/February 2001 <http://www.msd.st-louis.mo.us/PublicComm/Pipeline/1-2001/S3.htm> (17 February 2003).
[lxvii] Primm, 423-424.
[lxviii] U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places, Table 14; Table 15; Table 16; 15 June 1998, <http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027> (5 April 2005).
[lxix] Polk-Gould St. Louis Directory – 1925, quoted in David A. Lossos, transcriber, “Statistical Facts About St. Louis in 1925,” 9 February 2005, <http://genealogyinstlouis.accessgenealogy.com/1925statistics.htm> (23 March 2005).
[lxx] Mr. Otto Karbe to unknown, n.d., in League of Women Voters of St. Louis Collection, 1916 – 1977, f. 987 [Western Historical Manuscript Collection].
[lxxi] “How Kiel Has Kept Garbage Plant Promise,” unknown source (possibly St. Louis Globe-Democrat), in League of Women Voters of St. Louis Collection, 1916 – 1977, f. 987 [Western Historical Manuscript Collection].
[lxxii] E.R. Kinsey to Miss Josephine Shaughnessy, 9 February 1921, in League of Women Voters of St. Louis Collection, 1916 – 1977, f. 987 [Western Historical Manuscript Collection].
[lxxiii] Kevin Amsler, Final Resting Place: The Lives and Deaths of Famous St. Louisans, (St. Louis: Virginia Publishing Company, 1997), 189-190.
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