For the many students and philosophers of war, there are just as many varied theories on it. As the nineteenth century dawned, two strands of thought had formed: one, that war could be conducted on a rationally, strategic level; and two, that war is irrational, unpredictable, and dependent on chance. Karl von Clausewitz, the oft-studied nineteenth century military theoretician, holds a unique place separate from his contemporaries by uniting the two ideas. He saw war as an expression of violence separate from ordinary societal constraints, whose natural tendency toward escalation made it an erratically recalcitrant process. Therefore, no principles or rules can dictate the conduct of warfare; rather than a universal system of ideas, war consists of fighting, i.e. battles, which determines the outcome.[i]
This was an indelible break with traditional interpretation of warfare, seen as the model even during Clausewitz’s lifetime. Earlier theorists presumed that the principles of history and war were fixed alike. Clausewitz, however, implied that a relevant single theory might not be possible, as all war corresponds to the social and political characteristics of the period in which it is fought.[ii] Accordingly, Clausewitz proclaimed war a socially motivated, calculated political act that is “a continuation of policy by other means." As such, the political leadership is responsible for the conduct of it as an instrument of policy juxtaposed to the military command, and must therefore, have an understanding of military affairs.[iii]
The ancient Chinese classicists are still regarded as the preeminent philosophers of warfare, though they radically differ in interpretation from Clausewitz. The most celebrated of the ancients, Sun Tzu, and his contemporaries saw war neither as a tool of policy nor as an end unto itself, but rather an unavoidable means rendered from the world’s imperfection for maintaining, or conceivably restoring, harmony. As Wu Tzu declared to Marquis Wen of Wei, “a ruler might not have a liking for military affairs, but not to prepare for it was to fail his duty.” [iv] In other words, war is “the product of stern necessity...which must be confronted and coped with...managed and brought to an end." Therefore, the conduct of a battle – i.e. utilization of trickery and particular maneuvers – that emphasizes minimum force is the objective, rather than the attainment of any specifically tangible. As such, Chinese philosophy sought to gain an advantage over the enemy with the possibility of never actually engaging them – something Clausewitz considers mostly irrelevant, and mainly inappropriate, instead stressing maximum force based on brute strength to engage and overwhelm the enemy.[v]
There are, however, a few points that even Clausewitz must grant. Sun Tzu believed there were several issues a military commander had to master or otherwise face defeat: proper arms and equipment; plentiful supplies; good organization; and strict discipline. Other factors, such as assessment of the enemy strength comparative to one’s own, and consideration of weather, terrain, and command, were necessary for a successful campaign. Indeed, key elements of Sun Tzu’s philosophy are the ability to take advantage of fleeting opportunity with a flexible and adaptive response in conjunction with intelligence and espionage. He, like the strategist Tai Kung, believed a fluid army who knows their enemy knows themselves. And as Sun Tzu emphasized, “those who master them, win; those who do not, are defeated.”[vi]
It is not hard to understand why many looked to the ancients for their thoughts on the conduct of war. Echoing the Roman philosopher Onasander, Niccolo Machiavelli reiterated the necessity for a reasonable and just war.[vii] He went further in saying that no state could exist without a strong means of defense – which Wu Tzu had alluded to in the necessity for leaders to be prepared.[viii] Even Maurice, the Marshal de Saxe and commander-in-chief of French forces in the mid-eighteenth century, echoed Chinese philosophy when he emphasized maneuvers over actual battlefield engagement to fulfill the objectives of one’s ruler. Battle was to be conducted only as a last resort when the prospect of victory was assured.[ix]
Despite the widespread reiteration of ancient philosophy, several theorists did contribute original ideas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Raimondo Montecuccoli, military advisor to the Hapsburgs, articulated the idea that states rather than people or rulers conduct war – a definitive break from the classical ideas of the Greeks, Romans, and Chinese. Thus, war transformed into a product of governments and regular armies against each other, with political preparedness for alliances, financial resources, and the amassing of supplies a necessity. Even more, Montecuccoli made a distinction between external wars, typically against foreigners in another country, and internal wars, seen as civil uprisings or revolutions within one’s own borders – which later influenced Clauswitz’s own theory of “continuation by other means.”[x]
Writing at the end of the eighteenth century, Heinrich von Buelow conceptualized the idea of strategy separate from everything else. He saw war favoring states that were able to control the lines of operation (or communications) rather than simply winning a tactical battle. Thus, as Alexander the Great had learned and Napoleon, the Israelis, and countless others would utilize, even inferior forces could then overcome superior ones. Distinguishing between the organizational and technical from the operational level of warfare, the emphasis on strategic maneuverability became a key factor in war planning from von Buelow’s time onward.[xi]
Strategy and tactics aside, war planners consistently have had to integrate technology at their disposal. Though mainly disregarded by theorists like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and even Clausewitz, to name a few, technological innovations historically have shaped the when, where, and how of battle.[xii] As example, cavalry took the place of traditional chariot, while larger infantry formations brandished iron weapons instead of bronze throughout China’s era of warring states.[xiii] From Antiquity to the Middle Ages as well, military organization increasingly focused on the use of cavalry over infantry as the primary tool of warfare.[xiv] Thus, strategies and tactics associated with evolving types of weapons and equipment developed that enabled resilient formations, action from a distance, mobility, and ultimately, dominance over the enemy.[xv]
In the nineteenth century alone, the face of war changed irreversibly with the development of quick-firing weapons, trans-continental railroads, and communication devices like the telegraph. Soldiers could inflict more damage, armies could be more rapidly mobilized, not to mention increased in numbers exponentially, and lines of communications could be better defined.[xvi] A valuable lesson for the modern military could even be gleaned from the study of the outmoded Greek phalanx or Roman legion: “good organization, unit cohesion, thorough training, firm command, patriotism, and character.”[xvii] Thus, technological advances both old and new can be incorporated to influence the face of war, providing a necessary component for any successful military.
Seen as key to modern warfare, technology’s impact was not fully demonstrated until the twentieth century. Both world wars were driven by industrial production, with the United States’ industrial engine leading the way to victory for the Allies in each.[xviii] In both, mechanization integrated with tradition practically invisibly as an overriding principle of warfare.[xix] However, technological innovations over the course of the Second World War – most notably the atomic bomb – showed that all subsequent wars would be decided by the development of technology.[xx] As a result, technology itself became the leading factor in military affairs in the post-war era of the Cold War, acting as an independent agent influencing everything from politics to economics.[xxi]
The Cold War presented a unique argument: to keep the other from gaining an advantage in a limited war, the United States and the Soviet Union were forced to maintain parity on all levels in military preparedness.[xxii] Whether such a doctrine developed from paranoia or held an element of truth, mutually assured destruction became readily apparent.[xxiii] The traditional ideas of warfare utilized in both world wars lost all context, as engagement of large armed forces on land, at sea, or in the air was replaced by security achieved through the fearful threat of complete annihilation. The goal of winning a war by defeating the other’s army became an impractical option; instead, the threat of absolute destructive aggression demanded diplomatic measures and control of arms to inhibit the utilization of such means.[xxiv] Under such conditions, “the arms race became the moral equivalent of war.”[xxv] Paradoxically, despite the belief in the possibility of nuclear retaliation deterring an attack, the fear of inadequate response-capability further heightened the amassing of such weapons.[xxvi] Quintessentially, the Cold War epitomized classic Chinese philosophy: political gestures and military maneuvers meant to gain a superior position over the enemy without actual engagement on the battlefield.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the United States the sole superpower, many envisioned the era of global conflict at an end.[xxvii] Theoretically, the threat of nuclear annihilation was swept away with the Soviet Union’s fall. However, the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons among rogue states and other entities – some of whom were previously under communist rule or at the very least derived influence from it – has conceivably altered global conflict in terms of large-scale conventional warfare, rather than ending it.[xxviii] On September 11, 2001, terrorists succeeded in their plans to destroy the World Trade Center, though the act failed to achieve the desired destruction of Western society. In fact, just the opposite occurred as western nations opposed to terrorism rose up in a commitment to stamp it out.
Without condoning the action of the terrorists, the attack on the World Trade Center was undeniably classic Clausewitz – the delivery of a knockout blow in the expectation of a decisive victory. On the defensive initially, the United States and its allies’ subsequent offensive response put the perpetrators of the attack on the defensive – again, indicative of Clausewitz in the theory of a culminating point when an attack turns into a defense, and vice versa.[xxix] A comparison of September 11th with the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on December 7, 1941, and the subsequent raid on Tokyo by Colonel James Doolittle, is not coincidence. In both instances, a presumed decisive attack had the exact opposite achievement.
In terms of Clausewitz, terrorism had been thought of prior to September 11th as nothing more than an annoyance that promoted conflict through other means. In the aftermath, it has become the defining characteristic of current warfare. As a global entity, it has a defined goal against the established status quo: a quest for domination over it from its destruction. With state sponsorship and the potential possession of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism has thus achieved a status once relegated only to nations in conflict as a result of that aim.[xxx] As such, it is not a fanciful view to believe that terrorist-like organizations that are neither sovereign states nor territorial possessors – and thus immune to the threat of nuclear annihilation and free to wage war globally on a limitless basis from anywhere – will be the main, and potentially permanent, participants in all future wars.[xxxi]
By its very nature, terrorism cannot be contained or conciliated. In terms of Clausewitz, it must be met with full and overwhelming force to eradicate it before achieving permanency. With that in mind, the “War on Terrorism” is an absolute war espoused by Clausewitz et al with one objective – annihilation of the enemy.[xxxii] Only through such means can peace be attained – because from the perspective of terrorists and similar belligerents, they are fighting a total war from a militarily inferior position with no regard to limitations. Accordingly, a strategy of limited objectives that brings a quick and decisive victory must be employed, lest the belligerents gain an advantage by protracting such a conflict – an idea put forth by Clausewitz two centuries ago.[xxxiii]
Karl von Clausewitz was correct in stating the obvious that battles determine the outcome of war. Since antiquity to the present, how that outcome is determined has been debated for centuries. Since Clausewitz himself relegated “the ancients” to irrelevancy in his own time, the principles of war of even the recent past conceivably cannot apply to future warfare. As he suggest, it very well depends on the situation of the time. However, while the form of those battles, the technology employed, and the face of the enemy may change over time, there are three principles that transcend all: assessment of the enemy; engagement of them; and outcome. While the demands of provisioning and logistics, to name a few, will categorically affect the utilization of these principles, the overall objective of any war – victory over the enemy – remains universal. It was true for Sun Tzu, for Clausewitz, and a myriad of theorists and practitioners of warfare before and since. Undeniably, military leaders who are best able to adapt such principles within the context of changing circumstances will achieve ultimate success, as their victory depends on it.
©2005 Steve Sagarra
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[i] Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: 2000), pp. 111-1116.
[ii] van Creveld, The Art of War, p. 123.
[iii] van Creveld, p. 118; Larry D. New, “Clausewitz’s Theory: On War and Its Application Today,” Airpower Journal, Fall 1996, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/new-lar.html> (29 December 2004).
[iv] van Creveld, p. 24.
[v] Ibid., p. 119.
[vi] van Creveld, p.31-32.
[vii] Ibid., p. 46.
[viii] Ibid., p. 73.
[ix] Ibid., p. 87.
[x] Ibid., p. 73-78.
[xi] van Creveld, pp. 99-103; 109.
[xii] Alex Roland, “Technology, Ground Warfare, and Strategy: The Paradox of American Experience,” The Journal of Military History 55, no. 4 (1991): p. 453; 447.
[xiii] van Creveld, p. 26.
[xiv] Ibid., p. 52.
[xv] Ibid., p. 29.
[xvi] van Creveld, pp. 131-136.
[xvii] Ibid., p. 129.
[xviii] Roland, p. 448.
[xix] Walter Millis, Arms and Men (1956), quoted in Roland, p. 451.
[xx] Roland, p. 461.
[xxi] Millis, quoted in Roland, p. 450.
[xxii] Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993): p. 247.
[xxiii] Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (1995): pp. 159-160.
[xxiv] Jervis, “Arms Control and War,” p. 242; 252.
[xxv] Roland, p. 465-466.
[xxvi] Lebow, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” p. 161; 177.
[xxvii] van Creveld, p. 159.
[xxviii] Ibid., p. 209.
[xxix] van Creveld, p. 117.
[xxx] Parag Khanna, “Terrorism As War,” Policy Review Online, October 2003, <http://www.policyreview.org/oct03/khanna.html> (28 January 2005).
[xxxi] Khanna, “Terrorism As War,” p. 213.
[xxxii] van Creveld, pp. 141-143.
[xxxiii] New, “Clausewitz’s Theory: On War and Its Application Today.”
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