A Call to War
On October 2, 2002, President George W. Bush approached Congress, as required by the Constitution, to request taking military action to disarm Iraq and depose Hussein. On October 10-11, 2002, the House and Senate, respectively, voted in favor and approved a joint resolution, Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), agreeing with the president on the source evidence presented by the United States intelligence community. Intelligence based in part on briefings of the former ambassador to Iraq, Joseph C. Wilson, in conjunction with assessments from multiple foreign intelligence services. Ultimately, citing violations of numerous United Nations agreements and, specifically, the bipartisan-approved Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, there was agreement on the threat posed by Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. Four months later, Wilson outlined the case against Hussein in a February 6, 2003, op-ed piece for the Los Angeles Times, stating:
“Saddam Hussein is a murderous sociopath whose departure from this Earth would be welcomed everywhere…There is no incentive for Hussein to comply with the inspectors or to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction to defend himself if the United States comes after him. And he will use them; we should be under no illusion about that.”[1]
Of course, one has to ask three questions: how could Hussein use weapons of mass destruction if Iraq did not possess them? If Iraq did not possess them, why advance the idea in the first place? Because the threat was real, as Wilson, an expert on Iraq and Hussein, pointed out. Which leads to the third question – what happened to the weapons Iraq apparently possessed little more than a month before the invasion?
Nevertheless, the “unnecessary war,” as some are apt to call it, was justified beyond the issue of disarmament. During the 1990s, Iraq had continually violated the peace agreement ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Violations that the U.N. routinely failed to stop or, at times, even address, and which included Iraq’s biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs, i.e. “weapons of mass destruction.” In numerous resolutions between 1991 and 2002 – culminating in UNSC Resolution 1441 – the U.N. Security Council condemned Iraq’s non-cooperative behavior over mandated weapons inspections and overall material breach of ceasefire terms stipulated in the 1991 peace agreement (UNSC Resolution 687). Certainly, the various scandals involving the U.N. throughout the decade clarify why no sanctions against Iraq – beyond strenuous objections – were ever forthcoming or enforced. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), speaking in favor of voting for military action, best summed up the argument as outlined in the joint resolution approving it:
“I am voting you this power, Mr. President, because I know this nation would be justified in making war to enforce the terms we impose on Iraq in 1991…We stopped the fighting based on an agreement that Iraq would take steps to assure the world that it would not engage in further aggression and that it would destroy its weapons of mass destruction. It has refused to take those steps. That refusal constitutes a breach of the armistice which renders it void and justifies resumption of the armed conflict.”[2]
Weapons of Mass Destruction Controversy
On December 16, 1998, after ordering military strikes against Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs – which, according to the U.N., Hussein allegedly did not possess – President Bill Clinton addressed the nation, in which he stated:
“Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly.”[3]
In the aftermath of the March 2003 invasion and the ensuing chaos of war, the failure to turn up any weapons of mass destruction does not mean Hussein never possessed nor had the intention to procure them. Iraq had possessed, deployed and used biological and chemical weapons – both classified as weapons of mass destruction under U.N. convention – during the conflict with Iran throughout the 1980s. Further, Hussein used the same against the Iraqi people and the Kurds in the Northern Province before, during and after the end of Gulf War I in 1991. Especially, he turned them against Iraqis attempting to overthrow him on the prospect that the U.S. and assembled international coalition would assist them after the cessation of hostilities. (The support never materialized; a regrettable circumstance of the conflict’s aftermath.) As any investigator can attest, the lack of physical evidence never lessens the accusation. In testimony before the 9-11 Commission, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated:
“While some charge that the Bush Administration exaggerated or manipulated the available intelligence, the fact is that all responsible officials from the Clinton and Bush administrations and, I believe, most Members of Congress genuinely believed that Saddam Hussein had active WMD programs. While it is too early to declare that belief to be entirely wrong, I think we all have been surprised by the inability to find meaningful evidence of such active WMD programs.”[4]
Some point to the “Downing Street Memo,” a top-secret British memorandum outlining U.S. intentions toward Iraq, as concrete evidence of the Bush Administration’s complicity in gearing for war under false pretensions. There is an underlying problem with lingering accusations of lies and false intelligence, which ultimately, as it currently stands, failed to pan out: if the Bush Administration lied and falsified the evidence against Iraq, why stop lying and falsifying when the weapons could not be found? Why not justify the war through more lies and falsehoods about finding weapons, which ostensibly was the main goal? Why stop lying? The reason is simple: the accusations were, and still are, bogus, with all parties involved at the time agreeing that the intelligence was sound and that Iraq posed a threat. Yet, why still today is the finger of blame pointed solely at former President Bush for alleged lies, and not at the late Saddam Hussein who did knowingly circumvent and lie to the U.N. numerous times?
Accordingly, there are only a handful of options for the whereabouts of the mysterious weapons in the decade leading up to the war: Iraq never possessed them, as far back as 1991 under U.N. obligations to end the programs; Iraq voluntarily disposed of them at some point between 1991-2003, acquiescing to U.N. and U.S. pressure to end its ambitions; Iraq did possess them, subsequently hiding or disposing of them on the eve of the 2003 invasion. From all evidence – including the previously mentioned U.S. bombing of several WMD installations under President Clinton – it is documented, common knowledge that the first is not true. The second explanation, while the possibility exists, is doubtful given Hussein’s behavior toward U.N. inspections throughout the 1990s. That leaves only the third option, and the reason that led the U.S. and its coalition allies to war: at some point leading up to the invasion, Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. What happened to those weapons is to this day the lingering question.
Questions remain over the role Syria – now embroiled in civil war, with reference made to that regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons – and Iran may have played in the potential disappearance of such weapons from Iraq before the invasion. Certainly, Syria would have been, and still could be, an eventual target of inquiry, if not conflict, on the heels of a secure Iraq given the history and relationship between the Assad and Hussein regimes. Setbacks, mistakes and circumstances in prosecuting the Iraq War no doubt voided any such notions. Although a well-known supporter of terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Iran would have been, and still is, trickier. Yet, the U.S., alongside pro-Western allies like Jordan and Turkey, would have been poised to isolate and confront Iran from a more favorable strategic standpoint with a friendly, secured Afghanistan and Iraq on either side. A circumstance still obtainable, but slipping away as the U.S. disengages from those two still unstable areas.
Regime Change in Iraq
The argument persists that the Bush Administration’s true intention had nothing to do with disarming Iraq, but to liberate the Iraqi people by toppling Hussein’s government in favor of a pro-Western one. Whichever noble cause one chooses to pick, President George W. Bush simply adhered to and acted upon the previous administration's stated intentions. On September 29, 1998, the 105th Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Co-sponsored by Senators Bob Kerrey (D-NE), John McCain (R-AZ) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), and signed into law by President Clinton, the resolution made regime change in Iraq official U.S. policy:
“It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.”[5]
There should be little surprise in the resolution, as calls for regime change had been voiced since the outset of the Gulf War in 1990. Among them included General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., the then-commander of all ground forces, who advocated the idea following his successful offensive against the Iraqi army. Instead, President George H.W. Bush and General Colin Powell felt the U.N. coalition’s mission accomplished in ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The consequence of that decision no doubt played a pivotal role in the chess game that ensued between Hussein and the U.N. throughout the proceeding decade. In the same address to the nation on December 16, 1998, President Clinton mentioned the idea of “regime change” in Iraq in conjunction with strikes on their weapons installations, stating:
“So we will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people…the best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government - a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people.”[6]
While the reasons behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq may have been muddled and ill-formulated, all agreed it was the right thing to do five years earlier. The U.S. simply invaded Iraq and ousted Hussein from power as outlined in official policy for possessing, and repeatedly attempting to possess, weapons of mass destruction in violation of U.N. sanctions. Further, it was the provisional Iraqi government – a democratically elected one – that tried and executed Hussein for war crimes, both during his regime and in the face of the U.S.-led invasion.
War on Terror and the Iraq Connection
As the conflict raged in Iraq, the U.S. was still engaged in the global war on terrorism. Specifically, against the Taliban regime, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. While the Bush Administration took heat for an apparent blasé attitude toward them in the months leading up to the September 11 attacks, a majority in the intelligence community, and later the Clinton Administration, had shared the same attitude for more than a decade. After the prosecution of those involved in the bombings of the U.S.’s East African embassies on August 7, 1998, which included bin Laden, as well as the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, it was believed al Qaeda and its affiliates’ ability to conduct terrorist operations had been severely handicapped. Accordingly, they were deemed no longer to pose a major threat that could launch an attack on U.S. installations or territory.
In hindsight, it was an admittedly major underestimation; especially given al Qaeda’s subsequently deadly bombing of the USS Cole on October 12, 2000.
Nonetheless, President Clinton had several chances to kill bin Laden, potentially eradicating his terrorist organization before it became a greater threat. He failed to act. As described by former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson, bin Laden was twice in the target sights of the U.S., but the president did not authorize action against him until too late.[7] Even more, the Clinton Administration – including Berger, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and current U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, the then-Assistant Secretary for Africa – had continuously rejected and disregarded overtures from willing allies to cooperate in sharing intelligence and conducting operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates. This was especially true of the Sudanese government and their intelligence agency, the Mukhabarat, who had kept surveillance and extensive files on bin Laden and his associates, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Atef, throughout the 1990s. They continuously faced rebuff attempting to get those in Washington to listen against the prevailing conventional wisdom that bin Laden, al Qaeda and their sponsors were not a threat – because administration officials saw Sudan as a terrorist sponsor.[8]
In the U.S. federal indictment against bin Laden and Atef for the embassy bombings, the U.S. government recognized the connection between al Qaeda and Iraq three years before September 11.[9] Five months later, Richard Clarke, in the newly created position of National Coordinator of Counterterrorism, further confirmed the connection following a tomahawk missile strike against the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. Clarke, discussing existing classified intelligence, unequivocally linked bin Laden and al Qaeda to Iraqi nerve gas agents producing VX nerve gas at the plant;[10] he would recant the assessment to the 9/11 Commission six years later, testifying that the Bush Administration had prejudiced the finding of a link whether one existed or not.[11] However, several media outlets also highlighted the connection, including The New York Times:
“The new indictment…accuses Mr. bin Laden of leading a vast terrorist conspiracy from 1989 to the present, in which he is said to have been working in concert with governments, including those of Sudan, Iraq and Iran, and terrorist groups to build weapons and attack American military installations…including one deal he is said to have struck with Iraq to cooperate in the development of weapons in return for Mr. bin Laden's agreeing not to work against that country.”[12]
While the Times went on to state that it was unknown whether the alleged deal allowed al Qaeda to procure weapons, it certainly demonstrated a growing concern in both political and media circles at the time over the connection between the two. Clarke was not alone either. In a December 5, 2001, letter to President George W. Bush, ten Congressmen linked Iraq to the broader war on terrorism, stating, “As we work to clean up Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda, it is imperative that we plan to eliminate the threat from Iraq.”[13] Further, the bipartisan-approved Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 cited connections between al Qaeda and Iraq eight times as part of the broader war on terrorism:
“Whereas members of al Qaida…are known to be in Iraq; Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens; Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations; Whereas Iraq’s demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons…or provide them to international terrorists…combine to justify actions by the United States to defend itself.”[14]
Six days earlier, Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-WVa), a ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, had made the case from the Senate floor:
“The global community – in the form of the United Nations – has declared repeatedly, through multiple resolutions, that the frightening prospect of a nuclear-armed Saddam cannot come to pass. But the U.N. has been unable to enforce those resolutions. We must eliminate that threat now, before it is too late…September 11 changed America. It made us realize we must deal differently with the very real threat of terrorism, whether it comes from shadowy groups operating in the mountains of Afghanistan or in 70 other countries around the world, including our own…There has been some debate over how ‘imminent’ a threat Iraq poses. I do believe Iraq poses an imminent threat, but I also believe that after September 11, that question is increasingly outdated…The President has rightly called Saddam Hussein’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction a grave and gathering threat to Americans…we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat.”[15]
Despite all the evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, anti-war activists still vehemently protest any connection between Iraq and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Unlike accusations directed at Sudan prior to the attacks that turned out to be false, there is concrete evidence from Iraq itself. The Pentagon’s Institute for Defense Analyses official report, Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Documents, revealed that Iraq had trained terrorists for domestic and international attacks for several decades, even compiling a list of volunteer suicide bombers as part of a martyrdom project. Further, captured documentation indicated Hussein’s financial and material support of numerous terrorist organizations, including Abu Nidal’s Fatah-Revolutionary Group, Abu al-Abbas’ Palestine Liberation Front and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad.[16] As known associates often working together to carry out terrorist attacks, al-Zawahiri would merge his organization with bin Laden and al Qaeda in 1998; as of bin Laden’s death in May 2011, al-Zawahiri became al Qaeda’s supreme leader and is still listed under worldwide U.N. sanction and a U.S. State Department $25 million reward for information leading to his capture.
Conclusion
One can argue that the security of Afghanistan and the unconditional defeat of the Taliban regime following the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, should have taken priority over an invasion of Iraq. Yet, Iraq was a known and well-documented harbinger of both weapons of mass destruction and terrorists since the early 1980s, and the U.S. was prosecuting a war against terrorism and the means to carry out further terrorist attacks similar to September 11. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations were adamant about hunting down terrorists and those means, and the countries and governments that harbored them. The overall strategy of the broader war was more complex than Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in a worldwide conflict, and which included culpable sponsor-states like Iraq. To say that elements among certain U.S. allies, whether their governments were complicit or not, hindered those efforts numerous times is not a spurious claim. Most especially, Pakistan, while valuable in the global effort, warrants such scrutiny – failing to secure their border region with Afghanistan throughout the war, not quelling al Qaeda cells in their tribal regions and in harboring several high-ranking al Qaeda members, knowingly or otherwise, either captured or killed on their soil, including bin Laden himself. While future military historians and political leaders will continue debating the merits for and conduct of the Iraq War, on the 10th anniversary of its commencement the path that led to it is, and always was, clear: the defense, security and global interests of the United States, its allies and the international community, including a stabilized Middle East, against the threats to them.
©2013 Steve Sagarra
___________________________
[1] Joseph C. Wilson, “A ‘Big Cat’ With Nothing to Lose,” Los Angeles Times, 6 February 2003.
[2] Senator Harry Reid, Address to United States Senate, Congressional Record, October 9, 2002; pp. S10145-S10146.
[3] President William J. Clinton, Address to the United States, 16 December 1998.
[4] William S. Cohen, Statement of William S. Cohen to The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 23 March 2004.
[5] Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338), 31 October 1998.
[6] Clinton, Address to the United States, 16 December 1998.
[7] Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson, Dereliction of Duty; pp. 129-142.
[8] David Rose, “The Osama Files,” Vanity Fair, January 2002; Timothy Carney and Mansoor Ijaz, “Intelligence Failure? Let’s Go Back To Sudan,” The Washington Post, 30 June 2002.
[9] Federal Indictment, New York, 4 November 1998; “Bin Laden, Atef Indicted In U.S. Federal Court For African Bombings,” United States Information Agency, 4 November 1998.
[10] Vernon Loeb, “Embassy Attacks Thwarted, U.S. Says; Official Cites Gains Against Bin Laden; Clinton Seeks $10 Billion To Fight Terrorism,” The Washington Post, 23 January 1999.
[11] Transcript: Wednesday's 9/11 Commission Hearings, The Washington Post. 24 March 2004.
[12] “Saudi Is Indicted In Bomb Attacks On Embassies,” The New York Times, 5 November 1998.
[13] Text: Letter Urging Action in Iraq, The Washington Post, 7 December 2001.
[14] Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), 16 October 2002
[15] Senator John D. Rockefeller, Address to United States Senate, 10 October 2002.
[16] Kevin M. Woods, with James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project - Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Documents, Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2007.
No comments:
Post a Comment